19. (286) Marburg, Germany. 1405 Hours. 3/23/45. 20, 600 feet. 38ea
100 pound GP"s and 2ea M-17 Incendiaries. This is the most memorable
mission that the Lazzari crew flew. This was the first mission that
the 100th flew with a 4 squadron 10 plane per squadron formation.
Unna, the primary target, was successfully attacked by the first 3
squadrons. The 351st squadron, with Captain Lilinquist as command
pilot, Carl Hellerich as lead pilot and Leroy Duncan as lead
navagator, was the fourth squadron. (see a copy of the actual Lead
Navigator's log) The command pilot decided to bomb the secondary
target, Marburg. Immediately after dropping the bombs, the squadron
made sharp descending turn to the right. While in the turn, the
squadron took at least 3 flak bursts; one hit Larry Guardino, who was
flying in the 2nd element, and as the plane fell, his right horizontal
stabilizer hit our (Lazzari's) left wing and bent downward, 8 to 10
feet of the wing tip. With the tremendous drag that this damage
caused, the Lazzari plane flipped on its back, or nearly on its back,
and left the formation in a steep dive to the left. At this point,
memories that are 49 years old trigger different pictures of that
tense scene. Lazzari said, "I've always second guessed what might have
happened had I reacted quicker and helped Gene manuever away from
Guardino--but everything happened so fast and we were in such close
formation our options were limited. I often regret that I didn't
contact Guardino's family after returning to the USA." Greenwood has
carried with him for 49 years, the memory of flying the plane at the
time of the collision, and postulating many times. the "what if
scenario." "What if I had positioned our plane 10 or 20 feet to the
right, as Guardino went down, his tail would have missed our left wing
tip. However, if I had positioned the plane to the right, then our
plane would have taken the flak hit that Jim Lantz took, and since I
was on the right side of the plane, I wouldhave been wounded, and not
Jim Lantz." Greenwood remembers that instead of rolling the plane back
clockwise in order to get the plane up right, he should have let the
plane roll on around counter-clockwise and stopped the roll as the
plane became straight and level. As the collision occurred, the
formation was flying in excess of 150 MPH. In order to keep the plane
from rolling to the left, we were forced to fly the plane about 105
MPH back to Thorpe Abbotts, and even at that speed it took both
pilot's legs on the right rudder to keep the plane flying straight. By
the time they reached home. each pilot's right leg was stressed numb.
Within 3 minutes after the collision, the Lazzari plane was limping
along at 105 MPH, falling further behind the group. The ME-109's were
coming in for the kill. Lazzari or Greenwood broke radio silence and
called for fighter protection. Someone heard the call for help for in
less than 2 or 3 minutes 4 P-51's came in and fought off the attacking
ME-109's. The next decision was; shall we not take any chances and
land at Brussels, just in case there was more damage to the wing than
we could observe. As we flew over friendly territory, Waist Gunner Joe
Allen and Tail Gunner Dan O'Connell kept watching the left wing and
reported that everything looked normal and if we kept the air speed at
about 105, they thought we could make it home. One of them said,
"anyway, there's a dance at the Red Cross Club tonight and if we don't
get there, some other crew will take over our girls." So, with all
this technical and social information and incentives included in the
decision-making process, agreed that we could fly on to Thorpe
Abbotts; and we did without incident. However, read on! As we
approached the air field and reported our battle damage, the tower
would not let us land on the long runway 28 but cleared us to land on
the short runway 17. As we were on final approach to runway 17 with
the "Before Landing Checklist" completed and about 1000 feet north of
the runway and about 300 feet altitude, a black B-25 with British RAF
markings flew in underneath us with an engine on fire, and crash
landed right in front of us. Needless to say, there was only one thing
to do and that was to pour the coal to the engines and go around. It
was then that the tower cleared us to land on the long operational
runway 28. With the bent wing tip comfortably clearing the runway
surface by a foot or so, the landing was completed. It should be noted
that Master Sergeant Robert Hargrave, our crew chief, with some superb
dedicated technical help replaced the left wing outer panel and the
Lazzari crew flew it on two missions the very next day. What a feat!
What dedication! No doubt, it was performance like this that the
ground crews did day after day that allowed the flight crews to hold
so much respect for them. We, the flight crews, of the 351st will
always be indebted to Captain Bill Carleton, squadron maintenance
officer, Master Sergeant Bob Spangler, squadron line chief, and such
crew chiefs as Master Sergeant Hargraves, and their men. Flight time
for this mission was 7+15 hours.
After the Lazzari crew completed 2 missions on the following day, Doc
Kinder, after examining their eye balls, decided that 21 missions was
enough, so it was arranged to send them to the "FL4K SHACK" It was
during cocktails just before the evening meal at the flak shack, that
the Bomber pilot and the Fighter pilot feud heated up. A cocky 20 year
old Captain fighter pilot spoke, "let me tell you bomber guys just how
stupid you are for flying those things, a few days ago when my group
was performing escort duty for you guys, we got a radio call about a
lone cripple about to be attacked by the ME-lO9's. When we found him,
here he was trying to keep that lumbering hulk of metal flying with
his left wing all bent down." Lazzari and I about fainted. Here was
the guy who led the flight of 4 P-51's that saved us from certain
destruction. Talk about coincidence; this is hardly believable. The
story ends with the greatful bomber pilots in possession of a fresh
perspective regarding fighter pilots.
